Of the diplomatic approaches Ian Traynor (Report, 3 March) notes in his assessment of Ukraine crisis scenarios, the "contact groups" surely offers the only way forward. Blustering about political and economic costs only helps feed the Kremlin's long-held belief – one widespread in Moscow's political class – that the west is always out to do Russia down. Threats of sanctions against Moscow and promises of help to Kiev reinforce Putin's conviction that what drives the crisis is a plot by the US, Britain and some east European members of the EU, to bring Ukraine firmly into the western fold. Viewed from the Kremlin, even dislocated improvisation tends to look like well-planned conspiracy. It all looks even more malign from the perspective of the hard-line Russian nationalists whom the conservative Putin sees as prospective Ukip-like challengers.
The "contact groups" strategy would be far more fruitful, both in the immediate crisis context and in the mid-term. The EU and Russia should bring together representatives of the major political groupings in Ukraine and mediate talks to map out a road to greater devolution, something the recent congress of eastern regions called for. To get to any kind of agreement will require a lot of leverage from the mediators, but the process itself seems to offer the best way to a political rather than coercive resolution of the crisis.
We should now also look at ways of engaging Russia diplomatically at the European level to talk about a new European security process, with a view to building a new Atlantic to the Urals security framework. Western diplomats sigh at the mention of such grand schemes. Moscow's proposals for a pan-European security treaty have gathered dust on foreign ministry shelves for the last five years. But even if the diplomats are rightly sceptical about such schemes resulting rapidly in any useful new architecture, they underestimate the benefits of the process itself. More than half a century ago, after long resistance to Moscow's proposals for a pan-European security conference, the Helsinki process came into being. To many at the time, Helsinki seemed a frustrating waste of effort yet the process made an enormous contribution to the erosion and ending of the cold war.
Long-term engagement would not be primarily for the benefit of Russia or the major western powers. It would be most to the advantage of Ukraine and other countries of the euphemistically named "shared neighbourhood". I still remember the picture of Ukraine's international position drawn some years ago by a senior official in Kiev. Ukraine, he said, was supposed to be a bridge linking Europe and Russia yet hovered falteringly just above, and occasionally dipped below, the turbulent waters it was meant to span.
*Alex Pravda*
Senior research fellow in Russian and East European Studies, University of Oxford
• After the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Irish leader Garret FitzGerald wrote a letter suggesting that his country's policy on British security concerns might have had a lesson for the Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili. This is a voice from the past worth revisiting as Europe's Ukraine crisis is unfolding with potentially catastrophic consequences for the whole continent. While acknowledging that all sovereign states are equal, FitzGerald suggested it is wise for small states geographically situated besides larger ones to ensure their foreign policies do not pose any threats to their neighbours. He contrasted the Georgian independence leaders with his predecessor, Irish leader Éamon de Valera who offered as early as 1920 explicit assurances to Britain about the foreign policy of a future independent Irish state. Ireland's commitment to British security allowed the latter to preserve their relationship despite the bitterness following the partition of Ireland. Later on, the two governments used their relations within Europe and bilateral ties, including a civic forum set by FitzGerald, to promote a peace settlement.
The late Irish politician's words resonate well both with the Caucasus in 2008 and Ukraine today. Commenting on Saakashvili, he argued that "by allowing emotion rather than reason, nationalism rather than statecraft, to govern his actions, the Georgian leader has … unwittingly set back his country's cause – probably for many years in the future". Ukraine nationalists have also offered multiple opportunities for Putin to play the ethnic card across Russia and to this end, the west has inadvertently unleashed a wave of nationalism in Ukraine masked under the false promise of an expanded Europe. Ukraine deserves and should receive western support, but history teaches that external allies might prove even more dangerous in the absence of local statesmanship and wisdom.
*Dr Neophytos Loizides*
Senior lecturer in international conflict analysis, University of Kent
• Events in Ukraine are overly driven by political elites. The government could: forge ahead with "ask the people" initiatives and keep ahead of the game; propose to the elected parliament of the Crimean autonomous republic that it suspend all unconstitutional activity and stick with the Ukrainian government until the elections in May; promise that if secessionist parties obtain a majority of the seats, the national government will allow a referendum to be held in Crimea on the possibility of secession, or greater autonomy within Ukraine and some form of association pact with Russia. If the people vote to leave, this should be allowed via a constitutional amendment of article 2. With the promise of elections on secession, the Russians should have no need to invade.
The people's blood and suffering and wasted resources would be saved everywhere. Of course the cost to Ukraine is losing Crimea, but in the 21st century it is not legitimate to hang on to a territory only for national prestige, when the majority of its people are ethnic Russian and also want to leave. Turchynov and Yatsenyuk, swallow your pride for the sake of peace and faster inclusion in Europe.
*Dr Monica Threlfall*
Reader in European politics, London Metropolitan University
• With coups in Egypt and now Ukraine, we've perhaps become inured to the insouciant manner with which our media and politicians accept the overthrow of democratically elected governments when it suits their interests. William Hague and John Kerry, however, are breaking new ground in threatening Russia if it refuses to recognise Ukrainian politicians who've transitioned from opposition to government without an electoral mandate. They must give their own electorates clarity on the issue: just when can an elected leadership be replaced by an unelected one? When would it be OK to overturn the results of their elections in the course of violent demonstrations in Parliament Square or on the White House lawn?
*Peter McKenna*
Liverpool Reported by guardian.co.uk 8 hours ago.
The "contact groups" strategy would be far more fruitful, both in the immediate crisis context and in the mid-term. The EU and Russia should bring together representatives of the major political groupings in Ukraine and mediate talks to map out a road to greater devolution, something the recent congress of eastern regions called for. To get to any kind of agreement will require a lot of leverage from the mediators, but the process itself seems to offer the best way to a political rather than coercive resolution of the crisis.
We should now also look at ways of engaging Russia diplomatically at the European level to talk about a new European security process, with a view to building a new Atlantic to the Urals security framework. Western diplomats sigh at the mention of such grand schemes. Moscow's proposals for a pan-European security treaty have gathered dust on foreign ministry shelves for the last five years. But even if the diplomats are rightly sceptical about such schemes resulting rapidly in any useful new architecture, they underestimate the benefits of the process itself. More than half a century ago, after long resistance to Moscow's proposals for a pan-European security conference, the Helsinki process came into being. To many at the time, Helsinki seemed a frustrating waste of effort yet the process made an enormous contribution to the erosion and ending of the cold war.
Long-term engagement would not be primarily for the benefit of Russia or the major western powers. It would be most to the advantage of Ukraine and other countries of the euphemistically named "shared neighbourhood". I still remember the picture of Ukraine's international position drawn some years ago by a senior official in Kiev. Ukraine, he said, was supposed to be a bridge linking Europe and Russia yet hovered falteringly just above, and occasionally dipped below, the turbulent waters it was meant to span.
*Alex Pravda*
Senior research fellow in Russian and East European Studies, University of Oxford
• After the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Irish leader Garret FitzGerald wrote a letter suggesting that his country's policy on British security concerns might have had a lesson for the Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili. This is a voice from the past worth revisiting as Europe's Ukraine crisis is unfolding with potentially catastrophic consequences for the whole continent. While acknowledging that all sovereign states are equal, FitzGerald suggested it is wise for small states geographically situated besides larger ones to ensure their foreign policies do not pose any threats to their neighbours. He contrasted the Georgian independence leaders with his predecessor, Irish leader Éamon de Valera who offered as early as 1920 explicit assurances to Britain about the foreign policy of a future independent Irish state. Ireland's commitment to British security allowed the latter to preserve their relationship despite the bitterness following the partition of Ireland. Later on, the two governments used their relations within Europe and bilateral ties, including a civic forum set by FitzGerald, to promote a peace settlement.
The late Irish politician's words resonate well both with the Caucasus in 2008 and Ukraine today. Commenting on Saakashvili, he argued that "by allowing emotion rather than reason, nationalism rather than statecraft, to govern his actions, the Georgian leader has … unwittingly set back his country's cause – probably for many years in the future". Ukraine nationalists have also offered multiple opportunities for Putin to play the ethnic card across Russia and to this end, the west has inadvertently unleashed a wave of nationalism in Ukraine masked under the false promise of an expanded Europe. Ukraine deserves and should receive western support, but history teaches that external allies might prove even more dangerous in the absence of local statesmanship and wisdom.
*Dr Neophytos Loizides*
Senior lecturer in international conflict analysis, University of Kent
• Events in Ukraine are overly driven by political elites. The government could: forge ahead with "ask the people" initiatives and keep ahead of the game; propose to the elected parliament of the Crimean autonomous republic that it suspend all unconstitutional activity and stick with the Ukrainian government until the elections in May; promise that if secessionist parties obtain a majority of the seats, the national government will allow a referendum to be held in Crimea on the possibility of secession, or greater autonomy within Ukraine and some form of association pact with Russia. If the people vote to leave, this should be allowed via a constitutional amendment of article 2. With the promise of elections on secession, the Russians should have no need to invade.
The people's blood and suffering and wasted resources would be saved everywhere. Of course the cost to Ukraine is losing Crimea, but in the 21st century it is not legitimate to hang on to a territory only for national prestige, when the majority of its people are ethnic Russian and also want to leave. Turchynov and Yatsenyuk, swallow your pride for the sake of peace and faster inclusion in Europe.
*Dr Monica Threlfall*
Reader in European politics, London Metropolitan University
• With coups in Egypt and now Ukraine, we've perhaps become inured to the insouciant manner with which our media and politicians accept the overthrow of democratically elected governments when it suits their interests. William Hague and John Kerry, however, are breaking new ground in threatening Russia if it refuses to recognise Ukrainian politicians who've transitioned from opposition to government without an electoral mandate. They must give their own electorates clarity on the issue: just when can an elected leadership be replaced by an unelected one? When would it be OK to overturn the results of their elections in the course of violent demonstrations in Parliament Square or on the White House lawn?
*Peter McKenna*
Liverpool Reported by guardian.co.uk 8 hours ago.